Early Days—UNRWA and the Camps of Gaza

E. Mark Windle 21 April 2025.

For the past 6 months that I’ve been working on the Gaza book project “The Hundred Year Hunger” it’s been a constant challenge to sift out the propaganda, lies, claims and counterclaims. When it comes to UNRWA, one of the longest-serving aid agencies in Gaza, it has some failings. But equally, Israel’s ban on the organisation’s activities jeopardises the health and wellbeing of Gazan civilians. I’ll save the bigger picture for the book. Meantime, a reminder from me about the very reason why UNRWA was established in the first place.

Following the Arab-Israeli war of the late 1940s, a top priority for the displaced in Gaza, West Bank, Lebanon and Syria was to tackle the need for physical shelter. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was a response to the war of 1948 and the Nakba. Objectives were long-term: to follow up the work done by previous aid agencies such as the AFSC and International Red Cross, but also to minimise the chance of a humanitarian crisis relapse by engaging in projects that sustained adequate, decent living conditions, and provided education and medical care.

SHELTER PROVISION IN 1950s GAZA

UNRWA set out on the task of creating 53 refugee camps across these regions. Eight camps appeared within a few weeks in the Gaza Strip at Rafah, Jabalia, Khan Yunis, Al-Shati (also referred to as Shati, or Beach Camp), Nusierat, Bureij, Maghazi, and Dier al-Balah. For a number of years, living conditions were extremely basic. Some camps were large, some containing up to 20,000 occupants. Camps offered a better alternative to living in the open, but the situation was still dire with the majority of refugees entirely reliant on UN rations. Tents were often shared by multiple families, which introduced social issues including that of privacy (pregnant women had to give birth in the presence of strangers).

Conditions progressively improved through the 1950s. External financial support facilitated the construction of simple concrete houses. Water supplies, clinics, and schools were introduced. Groups of families who had come from the same villages converged, allowing small supportive units to form within the camps. In Syria and Lebanon, a small number of refugees were eventually able to leave their camps in the search for work and more permanent accommodation.

For the vast majority of those isolated in Gaza that wasn’t an option. Restrictions on movements meant that the search for work across the Egyptian border was rarely possible. Despite UN handouts, starvation and malnutrition were persistent themes.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE

Among the first commentators to paint a vivid picture of the humanitarian situation in Gaza was James Baster, one-time economic advisor to UNRWA. In a series of articles for Middle East Journal in the 1950s, his assessment was that Gaza City was no longer thriving. Its limited infrastructure had been ravaged, and the Strip was in deep economic crisis. The refugee labour skill mix could potentially contribute to the local community: the demographic was primarily composed of unskilled workers, but there were also skilled craftsmen, doctors and merchants. However, given the population density and the absence of an existing local economy, any job opportunities were limited. Geography was also an issue, with more than half of the Gaza Strip unsuitable for farming, as it comprised of sand dunes along much of the coastal edge and poor soil elsewhere. Baster found that poverty was endemic, and described the Strip as a rural slum:

“There is plenty of evidence that the Gaza community is living on its capital. Clothing is worn out, livestock is killed for food, the area is almost completely deforested as the refugees collect wood for fuel and building purposes, and the railroad track has largely been put out of action by the removal of several thousand ties which are invaluable for building timber and carpentry work.”

IMPROVING CONDITIONS

Over time, some aspects of the Gazan social and urban landscape was changing, primarily through UNRWA’s continued and externally funded efforts (which extended beyond the camps) and limited support from the Egyptian government. Journalist and former war correspondent Martha Gellhorn returned to the Middle East in the early 1960s, to comment on how Palestine had fared since the Nakba. The essay “The Arabs of Palestine”, published in a 1961 issue of The Atlantic, pointed toward early indicators of social and economic mobility. Infrastructure was being developed in urban areas. Cafes and restaurants were thriving. There was a noticeable increase in the number of cars on the streets.

The camps were ever-present of course, with around half the number of original refugees — and now, descendent family members — still living in them. Conditions remained far from ideal, though Gellhorn noted that most of the UNRWA camps were now more organised and working from a common template. Each had a supplementary feeding station where hot meals were provided for the particularly vulnerable, a few small shops and even a cafe or two which served as community meeting points. Once a month, refugees were given a basic ration of flour, pulses, sugar, rice, oils and fats, calculated to provide a total of 1500 calories per day per person. During the winter months, rations were increased by an additional 100 calories. Additional milk allowances were given for children and pregnant women. Those households motivated or able enough to increase their diet further kept small vegetable patches, chickens and rabbits.

Throughout the ‘official’ Israeli occupation from the late 1960s to the early 2000s, UNRWA was there to circumnavigate restrictions imposed by military order on water access in Gaza, to facilitate nutrition status assessments and household food security surveys and to refine approaches to combating malnutrition in vulnerable groups including women and children. Through time it was joined by other UN sister groups and other NGOs.

CRITICISM AND COUNTERCLAIMS

Almost since its inception, Israel has criticised UNRWA’s activities and its very existence. Accusations have included encouragement of anti-Israeli eduction in UNRWA schools, organisational failings and infiltration by members of Hamas. There have been counterclaims from UNRWA and its supporters in equal measure, and a feeling of deliberate Israeli intent to discredit the UN and block ongoing aid efforts to the civilians of Gaza.

Most recently, the situation culminated in Israel’s labelling of UNRWA as a terrorist group, and a ban of all activity in Israel and occupied East Jerusalem—including any dialogue between UNRWA and Israeli authorities to coordinate the supply of aid to Gaza. To date however, UNRWA continues to work in the Strip, and in schools on Israeli-claimed soil. (END OF PT. 1)

(Copyright 2025) E. Mark Windle is a freelance writer, with a former career as a clinical dietitian specialising in burn injury and critical care nutrition. He has also worked as a senior writer for Story Terrace (London, UK), and as a ghostwriter for Sheridan Hill / Real Life Stories LLC (North Carolina, USA).