E. Mark Windle 15 April 2026
Imperialist nations have long recognised the strategic importance of having access to the Levant. Over the last 500 years this region—the ‘eastern wall’ of the Mediterranean Sea, represented by the Palestinian occupied territories, Israel, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria—has seen invasion and occupation by the Ottoman Empire, the British, Israel and others. Dominance of trading routes on land and sea were the initial interest. These were established prior to the Ottoman arrival, though this period marked major network expansion as the empire spread across southeastern Europe, Asia and North Africa.
As has happened with other colonising powers, the Ottoman ambition to continually increase geographical reach could not be matched by the military and financial resources required to do so. Greed, national uprisings, the neglect of outposts and competition from other nations took its toll. By the early 20th century, the Levant was a major theatre of war. It was also to be the site of key trigger events which led to the oppression of Palestinian society that continues today: the British occupation, large scale Jewish immigration aided by the Zionist movement and the Balfour Declaration, the Nakba in which 700,000 Palestinians were forcibly displaced and self-declaration of the State of Israel.
Trade routes in the eastern Mediterranean
The Ottoman Empire may have been here the longest, at least in recent centuries, but it was not the first. Egyptian, Minoan and Phoenician civilisations already had a hand in establishing early maritime trading routes. Over a 3000-year period (and by 300 BC), ports were established along the coast of the Levant that acted as hubs for import and export. The Phoenicians shipped cedarwood and dyes. The Greeks using ports to move wine, grain and olive oil eastwards to Asia, and west to North Africa.
From the 10th century onwards, silk and spice would be shipped by Arab merchants. Under Ottoman rule, routes were expanded and connected to southern European. Ports in the central and northern parts of the Levant like Beirut thrived—at one point, this was its primary shipping port. These coastal cities were cosmopolitan in nature, invariably featuring bustling bazaars, mosques and centrally located markets.
In contrast, the southern Levant—including that region known today as the Gaza Strip—was largely bypassed by trading ships. The reasons were partly prohibitive: piracy in earlier eras, and shallow water which would be unsuitable for the docking of large ships. There was also little commercial interest in the land. Agriculture in the interior was limited to the ancient practice of musha’ farming, a self-sustaining community approach involving temporary land share.
By the coast, wide expanses of sand dunes and scrubland also reduced the potential for any major farming. Before the 20th century, coastal habitation rarely extended beyond simple rural village life in this corner of the Mediterranean. Then came the Nakba, population concentration and changes in land appearance. Refugee camps (and eventually, some urban development) would fill the landscape.
Gaza fishing industry
In a 2025 issue of the Journal of Palestine Studies, Annelien Groten addressed the paucity of documentation on Gaza’s fishing industry history.1 Accounts were compiled by interviewing fishing communities in the al-Shati refugee camp in Gaza City and the al-Tawfiq Fishermen Cooperative Association. Groten also commented on her personal observations made during NGO work.
Her essay “Fishing in Gaza: Between Cultural Endurance and Everyday Resistance” recognises that prior to mass displacement of 1948, fishermen led a life of relatively unthreatened self-sustainability. For the most part they worked to provide for their families, or at most, for small and tightly knit communities. The beginning of the Nakba and the immediate influx of refugees to northern Gaza brought great pressure on essential resources and on competition to fish the sea.
A centuries-old traditional way of life was being threatened. Simultaneously, new skills brought to the coastal regions would ultimately assist in the expansion fishing as a commercial industry. Fishing was likely at its peak in terms of commercial success during the 1970s and 1980s, when the population density of the Gaza Strip was smaller than later decades and fish yields more plentiful due to freedom of sea access.
Along Gaza’s 41km sandy coastline, fishing boats were launched directly from the beach or small communal or private jetties. The old small harbour in the Rimal district known as the Port of Gaza was utilised up to October 2023. It was never intended to accommodate large commercial ships. The water here is too shallow, and harbour lacked infrastructure required to handle large cargo.
Nevertheless, the port was an important focal point for the industry. Half of Gaza’s fishermen delivered their catches here at one time, and around three quarters of all fish hauls came through the port’s wholesale market. Fish would then be transported to smaller markets around the Strip for purchase by households and seafood restaurants.
Plans existed for the construction of a much larger, modern commercial seaport located just south of Gaza City. The concept was agreed in principle during negotiation processes in 1993. But long-term projects in Gaza often fail to reach completion due to conflict. Commencement of the work was delayed for five years over resource issues, then Israeli forces destroyed the early construction during the Second Intifada. Later what remained of the port was sieged by Israel and subjected to naval blockade. By 2014, the project was abandoned.
Weaponising water
While the dietary inclusion of sea fish is culturally significant on the coast, for a long time it was a lesser consideration among the wider Palestinian population. That has changed. The chronic nature of blockade, conflict, food insecurity and malnutrition has placed greater emphasis on any locally available produce, and on the importance of fish as a source of amino acids, essential fatty acids and fat-soluble vitamins. Canned oily fish often features as a component of humanitarian food aid packages, though the availability of fresh fish at market is determined by freedom of access to the sea.
Israel has a long track record of denying access to water. Weaponisation of water for drinking or sanitary purposes has been enabled not only through general occupation but by the specific application of military edicts that restrict access. An early example of this is a series of orders from the 1967 occupation that tightly controlled new water installations and the use of springs. A challenging application process for permit requests was required; frequently these were rejected without reason or chance of appeal.
In recent decades, Gaza has had to obtain most of its potable water from a combination of three sources: the Mekorot pipeline supply (connected to Israel’s National Water Carrier network and under State control), the importation of tanked or bottled drinking water, and three main desalination plants. Water is chronically compromised by restriction of the Mekorot supply, blockade, and the destruction of desalination plants by airstrike. In a similar manner, Israeli occupation forces have long enforced restrictions on sea access. This has profound negative effects on the ability to deliver aid by sea, to fish or sail in it or even to enter the sea for respite in hot summer months.
Oslo Accords and sea access rights
In 1993, Israeli PM Yitzhak Rabin and Palestine Liberation Organisation head Yasser Arafat met for a series of political meetings which became known as the Oslo Accords. An essential early requirement was for agreement to find a political pathway for Palestinian self-determination and coexistence with Israel. Commitment to find a two-state solution was demonstrated further in the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (commonly known as the Oslo II). Signed in 1995, Oslo II outlined organisational structure and power sharing changes envisioned for peace. Included in the plan was the creation of three distinct areas in West Bank, with a new Palestinian Authority conferred some autonomy for local governing and civil duties.
Arafat and Rabin received the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of political convergence and a pledge to find middle ground for peace, yet there was significant division regarding the implication of the Oslo Accords. As now, some Israelis and Palestinians neither sought a two-state solution, nor believed that it is feasible. Even for those subscribed to the idea, the devil was in the detail. Israeli concern was over the need for timely and phased removal of its military forces from territory it had occupied since the late 1960s and transferring authority to a new Palestinian body. Among the Arab community, Arafat’s political reputation was a mixed bag. Public perceptions varied between revolutionary hero, a statesman placed in an impossible position, and a leader who corrupted and betrayed the people he represented.
Within two years Rabin was assassinated by a Jewish far right extremist. A series of assignation attempts were also made on Arafat by a Mossad unit. Yasser Arafat’s death in 2004 has been widely attributed to a stroke, although the cause of death has also been challenged over the years, including controversial accusations of polonium poisoning.
The Camp David Summit of July 2000 was a failed attempt to finalise the peace negotiations. Palestinian representatives found the proceedings premature and overtly Israel (and US)-centric. Arguments arose over territory sharing, the right of return for first generation and descendant Palestinians, the implication of continued presence of Israeli settlements and Israeli control of Palestinian airspace. The political process floundered and inflamed ongoing civilian protests in the Middle East, which rapidly escalated into the Second Intifada.
Regarding sea access rights for Palestinians, Oslo II addressed these in Article XIV: Security Along the Coastline to the Sea of Gaza. Coastal waters of the Mediterranean Sea were zoned with some designated as no-go areas. These prohibited access to water adjacent to the Israeli coastline in the north, and to Egypt in the south:
“The sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip will be divided into three Maritime Activity Zones, K, L, and M, as detailed below:
(1) Zones K and M:
(a) Zone K extends to 20 nautical miles in the sea from the coast in the northern part of the sea of Gaza and 1.5 nautical miles wide southwards.
(b) Zone M extends to 20 nautical miles in the sea from the coast, and one nautical mile wide from the Egyptian waters.
(c) Subject to the provisions of this paragraph, Zones K and M will be closed areas, in which navigation will be restricted to activity of the Israel Navy.
(2) Zone L:
(a) Zone L is bounded to the south by Zone M and to the north by Zone K and extends 20 nautical miles into the sea from the coast.
(b) Zone L will be open for fishing, recreation and economic activities, in accordance with the following provisions:
(i) Fishing boats will not exit Zone L into the open sea and may have engines of up to a limit of 25 HP for outboard motors and up to a maximum speed of 18 knots for inboard motors. The boats will neither carry weapons nor ammunition nor will they fish with the use of explosives.
(ii) Recreational boats will be permitted to sail up to a distance of 6 nautical miles from the coast. Recreational boats may have engines up to a limit of 10 horsepower. Marine motor bikes and water jets will neither be introduced into Zone L nor be operated therein.
(iii) Yachts may sail up to a distance of 6 nautical miles from the coast at a maximum speed of 15 knots.
(iv) Foreign vessels entering Zone L will not approach closer than 12 nautical miles from the coast.
General Rules of the Maritime Activity Zones:
(1) The aforementioned fishing boats and recreational boats and their skippers sailing in Zone L shall carry licenses.
(2) The boats shall have identification markings.
(3) Residents of Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip fishing in Zone L will carry Israeli licenses and vessel permits.
(4) As part of Israel’s responsibilities for safety and security within the three Maritime Activity Zones, Israel Navy vessels may sail throughout these zones, as necessary and without limitations, and may take any measures necessary against vessels suspected of being used for terrorist activities or for smuggling arms, ammunition, drugs, goods, of for any other illegal activity…”
For the fishermen of Gaza, the distance allowed from shore to fish is crucial for fish yields. Bigger shoals are found between 8 and 12 nautical miles (nm) from the coast. Sardines, mackerel, tuna and other high nutritional value fish can be reached at 20nm. In practice, Israel did not adhere to Oslo Accord stipulations and continues to maintain tight control over Gazan fishing rights. Between 2008 and 2020, several severe restrictions were imposed. These ranged from a 3nm limit to complete fishing bans. Some temporary relaxations in policy did occur, though these usually occurred as a result of international pressure.
The livelihood of fishermen has been further threatened by restrictions on the import of materials for boat and equipment repair, which Israel claims could be used for the manufacture of rockets by Hamas. Registration statistics held by the Ministry of Agriculture indicate that by 2020 Gaza’s fishing industry had declined by more than 50%. Knock-on effects were observed on coastal restaurants and fish markets.
Dangers of fishing, post October 2023
In the early stages of the Israel-Hamas conflict ambiguity reigned over the status of sailing limits. Did previous restrictions still apply or was there now a complete ban on entering the water? By 2025, Palestinians were suffering from the cumulative effects of living in a war zone, a violated ceasefire agreement between January and March, complete border closure for 12 weeks and now a looming famine. Add to that the dependency on fish for food, and a July heatwave with temperatures in excess of 30 degrees Celsius and 60% humidity—avoiding the sea was not an option. Witnesses reported Israeli forces firing shots at swimmers near the shore, despite Israeli media claims that the IDF had not enforced the ban against those wishing to “cool off in the water by the beach, (but) only those heading out deeper into the sea”.
Israeli forces also intensified their assault on what little remained of Gaza’s fishing industry. Navy vessels repeatedly pushed fishing boats back to shore. Interrogation and confiscation of boats and equipment invariably followed, regardless of whether or not they had strayed beyond zone restrictions.
In a May 2025 UN review, Israel’s track record of fishing vessel interception was documented, including the use of lethal force. Ministry of Agriculture data indicated that 200 fishermen and associates had been killed either on land or at sea in the previous 6 months, as a result of drone attacks, naval boat gunfire or pushbacks using strong waves to force direction or to capsize fishing boats. Helicopters and drones set fire to fishing boats at the Gaza City seaport, three other major landing sites, and virtually all of 300 individual fishing stations. The UN also noted when fishermen tried to hide their boats in the sand, the IDF sent in bulldozers to uncover and destroy them.
By July 2025 the military direction was clear. Palestinians were now prohibited from entering the sea for any reason. The message was reinforced by IDF spokesperson Colonel Avichay Adraee, who stated that entry into the sea along the entire length of the Strip was forbidden: “We urge fishermen, swimmers and divers to refrain from entering the sea. Entering the sea along the Strip exposes you to danger.”
Israeli and international gas field interests
An added dynamic in Israeli’s desire to control maritime access is the competition for fossil fuel. Energy extraction projects have been particularly active since the early 2000s. After the discovery of Gaza Marine and Border Field natural gas reserve, an agreement was drawn up between the Palestinian Authority and British Gas to power Gaza’s main desalination plant for 25 years. Energy companies working in neighbouring gas fields (and in Israel’s interests) contested boundary issues and the Palestinian Authority’s right to licence. A court decision that the Gaza field was located in a “no-man’s sea” meant the plan had to be abandoned.
Since then, gas extraction by Israel in the Mediterranean Sea has been via the Tamar, Leviathan, Noa and Mari-B gas rigs, along with the creation of “safety exclusion zones” of 5nm or more. Gas is piped not only for Israeli use or but in deals made with Jordan, Egypt and the European Union. Israel has also ‘awarded’ gas exploration licences in Palestinian waters.
The flotillas—reaching for Gaza
Of all the prior civilian flotilla efforts to form a humanitarian corridor, carry aid and break Israel’s siege on Gaza, the summer of 2025 mission was the most ambitious to date. With collective fleets amounting to around 50 vessels, the Global Sumud Flotilla was an international display of solidarity, demonstrated by the scale of the operation, the mass presence of supporters at ports around the Mediterranean and by the world following the journey via social media and the press.
An early flotilla attempt was the 2008 Free Gaza Movement, when two boats carrying aid succeeded in reaching Gaza’s shores. In 2010, the Gaza Freedom Flotilla was established between the Free Gaza Movement and the Turkish Foundation for Human Rights and Freedom and Humanitarian Relief. That attempt to deliver food aid and building materials was halted by Israeli forces when the boats were raided. Ten activists were killed and 30 wounded. Subsequent flotillas have been unable to reach Gaza’s beaches due to sabotage and interception by the Israeli military, though the long history of missions have helped to keep the world’s focus on the Palestinian struggle and continued oppression.
In early May 2025 the Conscience vessel (carrying aid and up to 30 human rights activists) was attacked by drones around 30km from the Maltese coast. The following month, the Gaza Freedom Flotilla set off to deliver infant milk formula, rice, flour and medical equipment. On 9 June, Israeli forces seized the Madleen and detained participants in Israel before deportation. A third attempt was made in July by the Handala vessel but was raided again in international waters.
More than 500 civilians from almost 50 countries joined the coalition of existing movements, known collectively as the Global Sumud Flotilla. As with previous ones, this was a non-violent civilian intention to break the siege and deliver humanitarian aid—300 tons of it—and importantly, to keep the world’s eyes on the genocide happening in Gaza. The mission was a response to government inertia regarding meaningful intervention in support of the people of Palestine, and in many cases, national refusal to call out genocide.
The flotilla’s name reflected the coalition’s cause. Sumud in Arabic refers to steadfastness, perseverance or resilience. Participants came from a range of backgrounds including sailing crew, activists, medical and legal staff, journalists, politicians. Public figures included internationally recognised activists Thiago Ávila and Greta Thunberg (both of whom had been involved in flotilla attempts earlier that spring), and Mandla Mandela, grandson of Nelson Mandela.
Vessels were scheduled to depart from ports in Spain, Italy and Tunisia from late August onwards. Some were allocated to break the blockade in Gaza territorial waters. Others had supportive and observer responsibilities. Ruhi Akhtar, founder and CEO of the UK NGO Refugee Biriyani & Bananas joined the flotilla from the port at Tunis. Bad weather, technical issues and drone attacks on the Family leader boat meant a temporary delay in departure. However, by mid-September, Akhtar’s boat Summertime-Jong was heading toward the first port of call at Sicily:
“Summertime-Jong was designated as an observer vessel. Our job was to monitor the rest of the fleet for Israeli violations, to keep notes and to make reports which could inform future legal cases. Our boat also had a role as a ‘mother’ boat. It was responsible for carrying extra water, fuel, and equipment and to assist any boats in distress. Summertime-Jong was carrying people from Malaysia, Palestine, the UK, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Italy, South Africa, Maldives, Algeria, Tunisia, Turkey and Morocco. We saw that diversity as our strength. United in action, we were adding our voices to the call for freedom and justice for the people of Palestine and Gaza.”
While in Sicily assisting other boats in distress, news came that further drone attacks had targeted five boats sailing ahead of the Summertime-Jong. Although no boats were damaged beyond repair, this was a clear attempt at psychological warfare, as well as an illegal assault in international waters on a boat that carried no weapons. Messages were sent via social media to lobby local politicians, highlighting that governments urgently needed to respond to ensure the safety of their citizens.
“By the end of the month we were a few hundred nautical miles from Gaza” says Ruhi Akhtar. “This was the first time we could see a full stretch of vessels pushing forward together as one. It gave us a chance to catch up with Alma, the boat carrying Thiago Àvila and Mandla Mandela.”
By 1st October, the flotilla was nearing 100 nautical miles off Gaza’s coastline—the zone where the Madleen and Handala were stopped in previous attempts:
“We received news that Alma and Sirius vessels had their communication systems damaged. There was also further psychological intimidation from an Israeli vessel. None of us knew what was in store. There was little sleep that night, but we held onto the thought that the people of Gaza were waiting for us, that the genocide was ongoing, and that anything we were experiencing was nothing compared to what they experience every day.”
“Soon a number of vessels were intercepted late in the night. Communication with hundreds of our friends was lost. We had to assume that they had been kidnapped in international waters and were now likely to be in detention. The decision was made to redirect Summertime-Jong to Cyprus. We had Palestinian friends on board, and their capture could have resulted in them spending decades in prison. With Summertime-Jong as a mother ship, we also had a responsibility to liaise with others on land in the demand for the release of our colleagues from detention.”
Over 3 days in early October, Israeli forces raided 42 boats carrying food, baby formula and medical aid, and detained all passengers. Other flotilla vessels continued to push ahead. The Mikeno came within nine miles of the Gaza shoreline before interception—closer than any flotilla boat had achieved in recent years.
The extent of the interception was soon clear to all. Of the 462 participants detained, many reported receiving hostile treatment, including being held in poor captive conditions, subjected to beatings and verbal humiliation, and deprived of basic liberties. As anticipated, the Israeli authorities denied all reports. In Cyprus, Ruhi Akhtar and her team worked with colleagues to amplify the request for urgent release of those held captive. A few days later, once back home, she was able to greet some of the first detainees who were deported to the UK.
For all involved, there was always an awareness that the flotilla may not succeed in its aim of reaching Gaza. But the overall mission was viewed as being far from a failure. The Global Sumud Flotilla was a symbolic demonstration that global solidarity still exists and can be a powerful force. That solidarity has pushed governments, authorities and the public into action. A huge wave of spontaneous demonstrations took place in Madrid, Naples, Rome and other European cities in support of the flotilla and to demand the end of Israel’s siege. In Italy, there was a national strike. Dockworkers closed ports in an attempt to block arms shipments to Israel.
*
Since October 2023, the small Port of Gaza has remained been non-functional. Video surveillance demonstrated that within one month of the commencement of the Israel-Hamas conflict, arial bombing destroyed the harbour walls in four places and rendered 40% of moored vessels as non-operational (burned or sunk). A follow-up investigation revealed that all remaining boats in the port had been destroyed by January 2024. A harbour at Khan Younis became the site of an overcrowded camp for displaced people. Boats there were broken up and the wood used for tent poles and fires.
Since the so-called ceasefire was called in October 2025, there has been very little relaxation on sea access restrictions Depending on location or during evolving events the limit varies but generally set between 0.5-1.0nm. Even within permitted zones fishermen report that they have been targeted. At least 238 have been killed at sea or on land since the start of the conflict. Once there were 5,000 fishermen. Now, only 5-10% of Gaza’s fishing fleet remains.
For Ruhi Akhtar, there was some comfort in the knowledge that, while Israeli forces were distracted in their attempt to block the passage of the Global Sumud Flotilla, at least a few fishermen of Gaza were able to evade the maritime ban. For at least one day, possibly more, they could freely cast their nets and provide for their families. While additional complications now exist (the US and Israel’s war on Iran, and Israel’s advancement in military operations in Lebanon), the flotilla attempts continue. On 12th April 2026, 39 humanitarian vessels left Barcelona with medical aid, food, school bags and educational material. With around 30 more boats planned to depart from number of southern European and north African ports and the flotilla’s coordination with a land convoy, the 2026 civilian attempt to form a humanitarian corridor is set to be the largest yet.
(Footnote: Flotilla extracts from “The Global Sumud Flotilla—Sailing for Solidarity, Resilience and Hope”. Visit Refugee Biriyani and Bananas for full article.)
Leave a Reply