Gaza and the Floating Pier: The 230 Million Dollar Turkey

E. Mark Windle 22 June 2025.

Following the events of 7 October 2023, the effects of Netanyahu’s declaration of war and instructions of a complete blockade by Defence Minister Yoav Gallant were immediate. The water supply via the Mekerot pipeline network into the Strip was halted. Gazans were now wholly dependent on existing stocks of bottled drinking water, or tank loads that had already been brought in by aid agencies. For those in the north who followed Israel’s order to evacuate homes, only small supplies of food and water could be carried by family members on foot or by those who had some form of transport. Aid needed to reach these civilians via one route or another, and options were limited.

BORDER AND ROAD BLOCKADES

Even before the conflict, only three official border crossings out of the seven were open. Those were strictly controlled for commercial or humanitarian passage, or in the case of Rafah on the Egyptian border, subject costly unofficial processing systems and lengthy security checks. All routes were now closed and guarded. This remained the situation for two weeks, until calls from the international community forced a partial reversal of the decision for a blockade to allow the entry of humanitarian aid.

As far as Israeli security was concerned, Rafah was logically the first crossing to reopen. From the Egyptian point of view, doing so would carry an unmanageable surge of Gazans attempting to seek safety. It would also exacerbate the longstanding fear that Hamas and other paramilitary groups would enter the country and draw Egypt into a complex military and political situation. The Rafah border crossing was opened although goods entering Gaza were limited, with both Egypt and Israel searching cargo and dictating the number of trucks and the volume of aid allowed to pass. Since the opening of the Rafah crossing and until February 2024, around 200–300 trucks passed each day. This was less than half of usual. Some other crossings were opened under negotiation, including Kerem Shalom — one of the four crossings which had been closed prior to the conflict — and Nitzana and Kissufim.

TRUCK CONVOY CHALLENGES

Convoys faced a precarious journey even on the Israeli side of the border. Protest groups opposing the supply of aid while Israeli hostages were still being held captive by Hamas, attempted to sabotage operations. A series of demonstrations by Tsav 9, Forum Tikva and Warrior Mothers were made at the crossings of Kerem Shalom, Nitzana, Tarqumiyah and others.

These protests frequently turned hostile or violent. Truck drivers were stoned, and food and clothing supplies taken or destroyed. In one instance, trucks were torched by a teenage gang from the Israeli settlement at Evyatar. The passiveness of local Israeli police and inadequate protection for trucks travelling to the border were reported by two senior security commissioners to have been the result of a direct order from Itamar Ben-Gvir, Minister of National Security.

On entering Gaza, the danger for aid workers only heightened. The Gaza Ministry of Health, the United Nations and charities have repeatedly reported a number of attacks on aid workers enroute to central storage hubs, and on workers and those waiting for food at distribution centres. A small convoy of World Central Kitchen cars travelling between their warehouse and a food distribution area was targeted by missiles fired from an Israeli drone, killing seven workers. IDF later claimed there had been a serious violation of standard military operating procedures and had dismissed a number of senior officers and commanders. By November 2024, it was estimated that over 320 aid workers had been killed by Israeli snipers, open fire and airstrikes.

ALTERNATIVES TO GROUND CONVOYS

With the persistent problem of the limitations placed on entry at the border, and because of the dangers convoys were exposed to by the military and looting once inside Gaza, adjunct methods of aid delivery were proposed. Delivery of aid by airdrops and flotillas had been attempted previously in Gaza, all with limited or no success. However, by January 2024, the border blockades and conflict inside Gaza were hindering the supply of more than half intended truck deliveries.

The US, the UK and France have frequently employed airdrops throughout the Israel-Hamas conflict, though ironically this has usually been to deliver arms to Israeli forces rather than the provision of humanitarian aid. In the latter respect, packages have included legumes, cereal products, water, ready-to-eat meals, tinned food and women’s sanitary products.

Airdrops are costly and extremely inefficient. One truck has a capacity of up to 20 tons of aid: according to UK government figures, each flight drop by the Royal Air Force has averaged around 10 tons. Given that open areas are required for parachute landings, the flat Gazan coastline has been a popular target.

However, packages can land in the sea or present a danger to civilians — in active conflict zones, parachuted palettes of goods may be released from a height of 300 to 5,000 metres. Crowd desperation and the presence of semi-organised gangs waiting for airdrops also result in less-than-fair distribution of items. On the other hand, airdrops have provided one limited option to address the dire situation on the ground.

THE FLOATING PIER CONCEPT

The concept of using a floating pier and causeway as another temporary route of access was driven by the US Biden Administration, initially with reluctant agreement from Netanyahu. Within two months, the US military had constructed a floating modular platform, fixed in position three miles offshore. Goods would be unloaded from incoming ships, then transferred by smaller boats to a 500-metre long coastal pier on the beach. On the 9th May, the USS Sagamore was the first vessel to leave with cargo from the Cypriot port of Larnaca. A week later, the causeway was operational.

SCEPTICISM AND ABANDONMENT

The project was fraught with controversy from the outset. NGOs had little faith in promises of the protection of aid convoys travelling to and from the pier, particularly following the recent attack on World Central Kitchen staff. Some viewed the pier as a PR stunt by the US administration.

There was also scepticism that the pier would be used purely for a humanitarian purpose. Homes in the al-Zahra neighbourhood were completely demolished in the name of creating a buffer zone for pier access. It may also have been used by the IDF — in coordination with US forces — for a hostage rescue operation at Nuseirat refugee camp which had left over 200 Palestinians dead. US forces denied it had been used for military purposes, despite video footage of military equipment on the pier.

By 17th July 2024, beset by bad weather, sea swells, structural damage and the need for removal of parts for repair, the pier was closed. The US Department of Defense originally claimed it would facilitate the delivery of up to two million meals per day. In all, the concept had cost 230 million US dollars and was fully operational for only 20 days.

The pier delivered the equivalent of one day’s aid.

Modified excerpt from the book “The Hundred Year Hunger: A Timeline of Food Insecurity and Malnutrition in Gaza” by E. Mark Windle. Available to order now via A Nickel And A Nail (UK customers only). Rest of the world, order via Lulu.

(Copyright 2025) E. Mark Windle is a freelance writer and former clinical dietitian specialising in major burn injury and critical care nutrition. He has written for The Journal of Human Nutrition and Dietetics, The Journal of Burn Care and Research, Dietetics Today and Complete Nutrition. Mark was commissioned by the British Dietetic Association to contribute to The Manual of Dietetic Practice (Fifth Edition), the core reference book of the UK dietetic profession. He is also author of Food, Digestion and Nutrition, published by Worth Press.